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ABSTRACT
Assessing trust in online social networks (OSNs) is critical for many applications such as online
marketing and network security. It is a challenging problem, however, due to the difficulties of
handling complex social network topologies and conducting accurate assessment in these topologies.
To address these challenges, we model trust by proposing the three-valued subjective logic (3VSL)
model. 3VSL properly models the uncertainties that exist in trust, thus is able to compute trust in
arbitrary graphs. We theoretically prove the capability of 3VSL based on the Dirichlet-Categorical
(DC) distribution and its correctness in arbitrary OSN topologies. Based on the 3VSL model, we
further design the AssessTrust (AT) algorithm to accurately compute the trust between any two
users connected in an OSN. We validate 3VSL against two real-world OSN datasets: Advogato and
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP). Experimental results indicate that 3VSL can accurately model the trust
between any pair of indirectly connected users in the Advogato and PGP.
Keywords Trust Assessment · Online Social networks · Three-valued Subjective Logic · Trust Model
1 Introduction
Online social networks (OSNs) are among the most frequently visited places on the Internet. OSNs help people not
only to strengthen their social connections with known friends but also to expand their social circles to friends of
friends who they may not know previously. Trust is the enabling factor behind user interactions in OSNs and is crucial
to almost all OSN applications. For example, in recommendation and crowdsourcing systems, trust helps to identify
trustworthy opinions and/or users [2]. In online marketing applications[3], trust is used to identify trustworthy sellers.
In a proactive friendship construction system [4], trust enables the discovery of potential friendships. In wireless
network domain, trust can help a cellular device to discover trustworthy peers to relay its data [5, 6]. In security
domain, trust is considered an important metric to detect malicious users or websites [7, 8, 9]. Given the above-
mentioned applications, one confounding issue is to what degree a user can trust another user in an OSN. This paper
concerns the fundamental issue of trust assessment in OSNs: given an OSN, how to model and compute trust among
users?
Trust is traditionally considered as reputation or the probability of a user being benign. In online marketing, users rate
each other based on their interactions, so the trust of a user can be derived from aggregated ratings. In the network
security domain, however, the trust of a given user is defined as the probability that this user will behave normally in
the future. Based on results from previous studies [10, 11], we define trust as the probability that a trustee will behave
∗This paper is the full version of [1], which is published in IEEE Transaction on Dependable and Secure Computing.
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as expected, from the perspective of a trustor. Here, both trustor and trustee are regular users in an OSN where the
trustor is interested in knowing how trustworthy the trustee is. This general definition of trust makes it applicable for
a wide range of applications. We also assume that trust in OSNs is determined by objective evidence, i.e., cognition
based trust [12], is not considered in this paper.
1.1 Problem Statements
We model a social network as a directed graph G = (V,E) where a vertex u ∈ V represents a user, and an edge
e(u, v) ∈ E denotes a trust relation from u to v. The weight of e(u, v) denotes how much u trusts v, which is
commonly referred to as direct trust. A trustor may leverage the recommendations from other users to derive a
trustee’s trust, which is called indirect trust. We are interested in computing the indirect trust between two users who
have not established a direct trust previously. To solve this problem, we first need to design a trust model that works
with both direct and indirect trust. Based on the assumption that trust is determined by objective evidence, designing
a trust model can be stated as follows.
• P1: Given the interactions between a trustor and a trustee, how to model the trust of the trustee, from the
trustor’s perspective?
The second problem is to compute/infer indirect trust between users in an OSN. Solving this problem means the trust
between two users, without previous interactions, can be computed. Because the indirect trust inference is available,
a trustor can conduct a trust assessment of a trustee in an OSN. As such, the second problem is formulated as follows.
• P2: Given a social network G = (V,E), ∀ u and v, s.t. e(u, v) 6∈ E and ∃ at least one path from u to v, how
does one compute u’s trust in v, i.e., how should u trust a stranger v?
1.2 Proposed Approach
To address problem P1, we propose the three-valued subjective logic (3VSL) model that accurately models the trust
between a trustor and a trustee, based on their interactions. 3VSL is inspired by the subjective logic (SL) model [13],
however, it is significantly different from SL.
The major difference between SL and 3VSL lies in the definitions of uncertainty in trust. SL believes the uncertainty
in the trust of a trustee never changes, however, 3VSL considers the uncertainty increases as trust propagates among
users in an OSN. Therefore, an extra state, called uncertainty state, is introduced in 3VSL to cope with the changing
of uncertainty in trust.
The trust of a trustee, i.e., the probability that it will behave as expected, can be represented by a Dirichlet-Categorical
(DC) distribution that is characterized by three parameters α, β and γ. Here, α is the number of positive interactions
occurred, i.e., a trustor observed that the trustor behaved as expected for α times. β denotes the amount of negative
interactions, indicating the trustee did not behave as expected. It is also quite possible that the behavior of the trust is
ambiguous, i.e., it is impossible to determine whether it behaved as expected or not. In this case, we consider uncertain
observations are made and use γ to record them. Uncertainty is generated not only when ambiguous behaviors are
observed but also when trust propagates within an OSN, which will be elaborated in details in Section 3. The observa-
tions kept in α, β and γ are also called evidence, as they are used to judge whether the trustee is trustworthy or not. The
major reason of introducing the uncertain state in 3VSL is to accurately capture the trust propagation process. When
trust propagates from a user to another, certain evidence in α and β are “distorted” and “converted” into uncertain
evidence. Given a DC distribution, it can be represented by a vector 〈α, β, γ〉, which is also called opinion. On the
other hand, the trustee’s trust can be derived from a DC distribution; therefore, trust can be represented by an opinion.
In the rest of this paper, we treat trust and opinion as interchangeable concepts, unless otherwise specified.
To address problem P2, we propose a trust assessment algorithm, called AssessTrust (AT), based on the 3VSL model.
The AT algorithm decomposes the network between the trustor and trustee as a parsing tree that provides the correct
order of applying trust operations to computer the indirect trust between the two users. Here, the trust operations
available in trust computation are the discounting operation and combining operation. Leveraging these two operations,
AT is proven to be able to accurately compute the trust between any two users connected in an OSN. Because 3VSL
appropriately treats the uncertainty in trust, AT offers more accurate trust assessments, compared to the topology- and
graph-based solutions. On the other hand, as AT aims at computing indirect trust between users, it outperforms the
probability based models that focus only on direct trust. Experiment results demonstrate that AT achieves the most
accurate trust assessment results. Specifically, AT achieves the F1 scores of 0.7 and 0.75, using the Advogato and
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) datasets, respectively. AT can rank users based on their trust values. We measure the
accuracy of the ranking results, using the Kendall’s tau coefficients. Experiment results show that, on average, AT
offers 0.73 and 0.77 kendall’s tau coefficients, in Advogato and PGP, respectively.
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1.3 Technical Challenges and Solutions
The first technical challenge is that 3VSL needs to accurately model the trust propagation and fusion in OSNs. This is
a challenge because trust propagation in OSNs is not well understood, although it is widely adopted by the research
community. We address this challenge by using an opinion to represent trust and modeling trust propagation based on
DC distribution and several commonly-accepted assumptions.
The second technical challenge is that 3VSL must be able to work on OSNs with non-series-parallel network topolo-
gies. This is a challenge because the only allowed operations in trust assessment are trust propagation and trust fusion.
However, these two operations require that a network’s topology must be either series and/or parallel. This require-
ment cannot be satisfied in real-world online social networks. We address this challenge by differentiating distorting
opinions from original opinions. For example, if Alice trusts Bob and Bob trusts Charlie, then Alice’s opinion on Bob
is called the distorting opinion, and Bob’s opinion on Charlie is the original opinion. We find that original opinions can
be fused only once but distorting opinions can be combined any number of times. This discovery lays the foundation
for the proposed recursive AssessTrust algorithm. The third technical challenge is that 3VSL needs to handle social
networks with arbitrary topologies, even with cycles. This is a challenge because it is impossible to test 3VSL in all
possible network topologies. We address this challenge by mathematically proving 3VSL works in arbitrary networks.
The proof is based upon the characteristics of Dirichlet distribution and the properties of different opinions in the trust
computation process. In the end, the AssessTrust algorithm is designed to compute the trust between any two users in
an OSN.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the background and terminologies of trust are introduced. In
Section 3, we introduce the 3VSL model and define the trust propagation and fusion operations. We then differentiate
discounting opinions from original opinions in Section 4, and prove 3VSL can handle arbitrary network topologies.
In the same section, we detail the proposed AssessTrust algorithm. In Section 5, we validate the 3VSL model and the
AssessTrust algorithm, using two real-world datasets. The related work is given in Section 6. We conclude the paper
in Section 8.
2 Background
2.1 Terminology
In this section, we briefly introduce some terminologies frequently referred in this paper. Trust assessment is defined
as the process that a trustor assesses a trustee on whether it will perform a certain task as expected. As such, trust can
be either direct or indirect [14]. Direct trust is formed from a trustor’s direct interactions with a trustee while indirect
trust is inferred from others’ recommendations. Typically, trust is represented as an opinion, indicating how much a
trustor trusts a trustee.
To model trust propagation and trust fusion, two opinion operations, i.e., the discounting operation and combining
operation, are design to facilitate trust computation/assessment [14]. Trust fusion refers to combining different trust
opinions to form a consensus trust opinion. Trust propagation refers to a trust opinion being transferred from a user
to another. For example, if A trusts B, and B trusts C, then B’s opinion on C will be discounted by A to derive an
indirect opinion of C’s trust.
2.2 Subjective Logic
To better understand 3VSL, we first briefly introduce the subjective logic (SL) [13]. Considering two users A and X ,
A’s opinion onX’s trust can be described by an opinion.
ωAX = 〈αAX , βAX , 2〉 |aAX ,
where αAX , βAX , and 2 denote the amounts of evidence supporting user X is trustworthy, untrustworthy, and uncer-
tain, respectively. Based on αAX and βAX , a Beta distribution can be formed to model A’s trust inX .
In SL, the amount of uncertain evidence in an opinion is always 2. aAX is called the base rate and formed from existing
impression without solid evidence, e.g., prejudice, preference, or a general opinion obtained from hearsay. For exam-
ple, if A always distrusts/trusts the users from a certain group where X belongs to, then aAX will be smaller/greater
than 0.5. Note that the opinion in SL [13] was defined as ωAX = 〈bAX , dAX , uAX〉 |aAX , which is another form of
3
A FULL VERSION
the trust opinion. The connection between these two opinion representations is mentioned in [13] as follows.
bAX =
αAX
αAX + βAX + 2
dAX =
βAX
αAX + βAX + 2
(2.1)
uAX =
2
αAX + βAX + 2
Leveraging the property of Beta distribution, two opinions can be fused, by combining the correspondingBeta distribu-
tions, to yield a new opinion. For example, opinions ω1 = 〈α1, β1, 2〉 |a1 and ω2 = 〈α2, β2, 2〉 |a2 can be combined
to produce ω12 = 〈α12, β12, 2〉 |a12 , where α12, β12 and a12 are calculated as follows.

α12 = α1 + α2
β12 = β1 + β2
a12 =
a1 + a2
2
.
Let A and B denote two users where ω1 = 〈α1, β1, 2〉 |a1 is A’s opinion about B’s trust. Assume C is another user
and ω2 = 〈α2, β2, 2〉 |a2 is B’s opinion about C’s trust. Then, the discounting operation is applied to compute A’s
indirect opinion about C’s trust ωAC = 〈α12, β12, 2〉 |a12 where

α12 =
α1α2
(β2 + α2 + 2) (β1 + α1 + 2)
·
2
κ
α12 =
α1β2
(β2 + α2 + 2) (β1 + α1 + 2)
·
2
κ
a12 = a2
,
and
κ = 1−
(α1α2 + α1β2)
(β2 + α2 + 2) (β1 + α1 + 2)
.
3 Three-Valued Subjective Logic
The major limitation of the SL model is that the uncertainty in trust is considered a constant, however, the uncertainty
in a trust opinion will be increased when it propagates from a user to another. To address this issue, we propose the
three-valued subjective logic (3VSL) to model trust between users in an OSN, by redefining the uncertainty in trust.
Designing the 3VSL model is a challenging task as trust propagation in OSNs is not well understood, although it is
widely used in many applications. We address this challenge by modeling trust as an opinion, a representation of a
probabilistic distribution over three different states, i.e., trustworthy, untrustworthy, and uncertain. By investigating
how these states of an opinion change during trust propagation,we redesign the trust discounting operation. Leveraging
the Dirichlet distribution, we also redesign the combining operation. Moreover, we discover the mechanism of how to
correctly apply these opinion operations on trust assessment within an OSN, leading to the design of the AssessTrust
algorithm.
3.1 A Probabilistic Interpretation of Trust
Trust in 3VSL is defined as the probability that a trustee will behave as expected in the future. The probability is
determined by the amounts of evidence that a trustor observed about a trustee’s historical behaviors. A trustee may
be observed behaving as expected, not expected, or in an ambiguous way. As a result, a trustor obtains positive,
negative, and uncertain evidence accordingly. Based on the observed evidence, Bayesian inference is used to infer the
probability of a trustee being trustworthy, or the probability that a trustee will behave as expected in the future. In
summary, given more positive observed evidence, the probability of a trustee being trustworthy is larger.
The uncertainty state in 3VSL not only contains the observed uncertain evidence but also the distorted evidence when
trust propagates in the network. Knowing how much evidence is distorted will give us an idea of how much positive
(and negative) evidence left, which must be accurate so that the probability inference (of trust) could be precise.
Without keeping track of uncertainty evidence, the amount of certain evidence in an opinion becomes incorrect, leading
to erroneous trust assessments.
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A trustee’s future behavior can be modeled as a random variable x that takes on one of three possible outcomes
{1, 2, 3}, i.e., x = 1, x = 2 and x = 3 indicating the trustee will behave as expected, not as expected, or in an
ambiguous way, respectively. As such, we are interested in the probability that x = 1, which is determined by the
positive observed behaviors of the trustee. Therefore, the probability density function (pdf) of x follows the Categorical
distribution.
f(x|p) =
3∏
i=1
p
[x=i]
i ,
where p = (p1, p2, p3) and p1 + p2 + p3 = 1, pi represents the probability of observing event i. The Iverson bracket
[x = i] evaluates to 1 if x = i, and 0 otherwise.
If the value of p is available, the pdf of x will be known and the probability of x = i can be computed. Unfortunately,
p is an unknown parameter and needs to be estimated based on the observations of x. We treat p as three random
variables that follow the Dirichlet distribution.
p ∼ Dir(α, β, γ),
where α, β, γ are hyper-parameters that control the shape of the Dirichlet distribution. We assume p follows Dirichlet
distribution mainly because it is a conjugate prior of categorical distribution. In addition, because Dirichlet distribution
belongs to a family of continuous multivariate probability distributions, we have various pdfs for p by changing the
values of α, β, γ.
f(p) = Cp1
α−1p2
β−1p3
γ−1, (3.1)
where C is a normalizing factor ensuring p1 + p2 + p3 = 1. In this way, we use p ∼ Dir(α, β, γ) to model the
uncertainty in estimating p.
With the mathematical model in place, p can be estimated based on the observations of x, according to the Bayesian
inference. Given a set of independent observations of x, denoted by D = {x1, x2, · · · , xn} where xj ∈ {1, 2, 3} and
j = 1, 2, · · · , n, we want to know how likelyD is observed. This probability can be computed as
P (D|p) =
n∏
j=1
p
[xj=1]
1 p
[xj=2]
2 p
[xj=3]
3 .
Let ci denote the number of observations where x = i, then the above equation becomes p
c1
1 p
c2
2 p
c3
3 . Based on Bayesian
inference, given observed data D, the posterior pdf of p can be estimated from
f(p|D) =
P (D|p)f(p)
P (D)
,
where P (D|p) = pc11 p
c2
2 p
c3
3 is the likelihood function, and f(p) the prior pdf of p. P (D) is the probability thatD is
observed, which is independent of p. Therefore, we have
f(p|D) ∝ pc11 p
c2
2 p
c3
3 × p
α−1
1 p
β−1
2 p
γ−1
3 .
That means the posterior pdf f(p|D) can be modeled by another Dirichlet distribution Dir(α + c1, β + c2, γ + c3).
With the posterior pdf of p, we have the following predicative model for x.
f(x|D) =
∫
f(x|p)f(p|D)dp. (3.2)
This function is in fact a composition of Categorical (f(x|p)) and Dirichlet (f(p|D)) distributions, so it is called
Dirichlet-Categorical (DC) distribution [15].
3.2 Opinion
In the previous section, we introduce how to model a trustee’s future behavior by a DC distribution. From a DC
distribution, the probability that the trustee is trustworthy can be derived from Eq. 3.2. Because the shape of a DC
distribution is determined by three parameters, we use these parameters to form a vector to represent it. This vector is
called opinion that expresses a trustor’s opinion about a trustee’s trust.
For a given DC distribution, the only undetermined parameters are α, β, γ. We set α = β = γ = 1, if there is no
observed data, i.e., D = ∅. In this case, the DC distribution yields a uniform distribution, i.e., p1 = p2 = p3 = 1/3.
Assuming p initially follows uniform distribution is reasonable because we make no observation of x, and the best
choice is to believe that x could be 1, 2, or 3 with equal probability. As more observations of x are made, the pdf of p
becomes more accurate.
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Figure 1: Examples of series topologies
From Eq. 3.2, we can compute the probability of x = 1, i.e., whether a trustee will behave as expected. In other words,
we can use Eq. 3.2 to infer the trust of the trustee. Specifically, we can obtain the expectation of the probability that
the trustee will behave as expected as follows.
P (x = 1|D)
=
∫
P (x = 1|p1, p2, p3)P (p1, p2, p3|c1, c2, c3)d(p1, p2, p3)
=
Γ (c1 + c2 + c3)
Γ (c1)Γ (c2)Γ (c3)
∫
pc1−11 p
c2−1
2 p
c3−1
3
=
Γ (c1 + c2 + c3)Γ (c1 + 1)Γ (c2)Γ (c3)
Γ (c1)Γ (c2)Γ (c3)Γ (c1 + c2 + c3 + 1)
=
c1
c1 + c2 + c3
, (3.3)
where Γ (n) = (n − 1)! is the Gamma function. In the same way, the probabilities that the trustee will behave not as
expected, or in an ambiguous way, can be computed from
P (x = 2|D) =
c2
c1 + c2 + c3
,
and
P (x = 3|D) =
c3
c1 + c2 + c3
.
If the hyper-parameters α, β, γ equal to 1, the future behavior of the trustee is only determined by c1, c2, c3, i.e., the
numbers of observations collected when the trustee behaved as expected, not as expected, or in an ambiguous way. We
name these observations as positive, negative, and uncertain evidence. From a trustor A’s perspective, a trustee X’s
future behavior can be modeled a DC distribution that is represented as an opinion.
ωAX = 〈αAX , βAX , γAX〉 |aAX .
Here, ωAX denotes A’s opinion on X’s future behavior, or A’s trust in X behaving as expected. The parameters
αAX , βAX , γAX refer to the amounts of observed positive, negative and uncertain evidence, respectively. We further
name them as the belief, distrust and uncertainty parameters, in the rest of the paper. The subscripts ofαAX , βAX , γAX
differentiate them from the prior α, β, γ, i.e., the former represents observed evidence while the latter is always
(1, 1, 1).
3.3 Discounting Operation
Trust propagation in OSNs was well-known, however, there is a lack of understanding about how to computationally
model the process in practice. Trust propagation can be illustrated by a series topology, as shown in Fig. 1(a). In the
figure, two edges are connected in series if they are incident to a vertex of degree 2. Trust propagation means that if
user Ai−1 trusts Ai and Ai trusts Ai+1, then Ai−1 can derive an indirect trust of Ai+1, even if Ai−1 did not interact
with Ai+1 before.
Based on existing literature on trust propagation [16, 17, 18, 19], it is commonly agreed that the following assumptions
hold.
• A1: If A trusts B, B trusts C, then A trusts C.
• A2: If A trusts B, B does not trust C, then A does not trust C.
• A3: If A trusts B, B is uncertain about the trust of C, then A is uncertain about C’s trust.
• A4: If A does not trust B, or A is uncertain about B, then A is uncertain about the trust of C.
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It is worth mentioning that if A does not trust or is uncertain about B, then A is uncertain about C, and B’s opinion
on C cannot propagate to A. Based on the above-mentioned four assumptions, the trust propagation process can be
modelled by the logic operation on two trust opinions.
Let’s denote A’s opinion on B as
ωAB = 〈αAB, βAB, γAB〉 ,
and B’s opinion on C as
ωBC = 〈αBC , βBC , γBC〉 ,
where {αAB, βAB, γAB} = DAB and {αBC , βBC , γBC} = DBC represent the observationsmade byA andB, about
B and C, respectively. In this way, the expected probability that C will behave as what A expects will be∫∫
(x = 1|pAB)f(pAB |DAB)×
f(x = 1|pBC)f(pBC |DBC)d(pAB)d(pBC).
(3.4)
The equation makes sense because A trusts C if and only if A trusts B and B trusts C, which is the assumption A1.
In other words, the probability that C will behave as what A expects is equal to the probability that C will behave as
what B expects, if A trusts B. In the above equation, f(x = 1|pAB)f(pAB|DAB) gives the probability that A trusts
B, and f(x = 1|pBC)f(pBC |DBC)d(pAB) is the probability that B trusts C.
Because the probabilities that A trusts B and B trusts C are independent of each other, Eq. 3.4 can be rewritten as∫
f(x = 1|pAB)f(pAB|DAB)d(pAB)×∫
f(x = 1|pBC)f(pBC |DBC)d(pBC). (3.5)
The two integrals in the equation are used to compute the expected probabilities that A trusts B and B trusts C,
respectively. According to Eq. 3.3, we know∫
f(x = 1|pAB)f(pAB|DAB)d(pAB)
=
αAB
αAB + βAB + γAB
,
and ∫
f(x = 1|pBC)f(pBC |DBC)d(pBC)
=
αBC
αBC + βBC + γBC
.
Inserting these two values into Eq. 3.5, we have the probability that C will behave as what A expects as
αABαBC
(αAB + βAB + γAB)(αBC + βBC + γBC)
. (3.6)
According to assumption A2, the probability that C will not behave as what A expects is∫∫
f(x = 1|pAB)f(pAB|DAB)×
f(x = 2|pBC)f(pBC |DBC)d(pAB)d(pBC).
(3.7)
This is because A does not trust C, if and only if A trusts B but B does not trust C. Because these probabilities are
independent, we have the expected probability that A does not trust C as
αABβBC
(αAB + βAB + γAB)(αBC + βBC + γBC)
. (3.8)
7
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Finally, based on assumptions A3 and A4, the expected probability that C will behave in an ambiguous way is∫∫
f(x = 1|pAB)f(pAB |DAB)×
f(x = 3|pBC)f(pBC |DBC)+
f(x = 2|pAB)f(pAB |DAB) + f(x = 3|pAB)f(pAB |DAB)
d(pAB)d(pBC).
The expected probability can be rewritten as
αABγBC + (βAB + γAB)(αBC + βBC + γBC)
(αAB + βAB + γAB)(αBC + βBC + γBC)
. (3.9)
The summation of Eqs. 3.4, 3.7 and 3.9 equals 1. The three equations actually give the estimated probabilities that
C will behave as expected, not as expected, or in an ambiguous way, respectively. Putting these values back into the
Categorical distribution
f(x|pAC) =
3∏
i=1
p
[x=i]
i , (3.10)
where pAC = (p1, p2, p3) and
p1 =
αABαBC
(αAB + βAB + γAB)(αBC + βBC + γBC)
p2 =
αABβBC
(αAB + βAB + γAB)(αBC + βBC + γBC)
,
p3 =
(βAB + γAB)(αBC + βBC + γBC) + αABγBC
(αAB + βAB + γAB)(αBC + βBC + γBC)
(3.11)
we can compute the probability thatX is trustworthy.
From the above description, we know the Categorical distribution is in fact derived from B’s opinion on C. Let’s
assume B made the observations x = {x1, x2, · · · , xn} on C. Then, we know αBC , βBC , γBC equal to the numbers
of observations where x = 1, x = 2, x = 3, respectively. Clearly, the observationsB made about C do not reflect A’s
opinion on C. As trust propagates among users, A could derive an indirect opinion from B’s observations of C. One
may ask the question that if A was provided with the n observations, how many of them will be considered positive,
negative, and uncertain, from A’s perspective. That impliesA needs to reuse B’s observations on C to derive its own
opinion on C. For each xj ∈ x where j = 1, 2, · · · , n, we know xj is observed, given the underlying categorical
distribution shown in Eq. 3.10. In other words, x follows the multinomial distribution with parameters (n,pAC).
From the multinomial distribution, we can recompute the probability that C is trustworthy, by re-categorizing the
observations x. We know the following re-categorization will occur with the highest probability.
αAC = p1(αBC + βBC + γBC)
=
αABαBC
(αAB + βAB + γAB)
,
βAC = p2(αBC + βBC + γBC)
=
αABβBC
(αAB + βAB + γAB)
,
γAC = p3(αBC + βBC + γBC),
=
(βAB + γAB)(αBC + βBC + γBC) + αABγBC
(αAB + βAB + γAB)
.
(3.12)
Therefore, we use ωAC = 〈αAC , βAC , γAC〉 to represent A’s opinion about C’s trust. Note that the opinion ωAC is
generated by distorting positive and negative evidence in ωBC to uncertain evidence. That also means the total amount
of evidence does not change in trust propagation.
αAC + βAC + γAC = αBC + βBC + γBC . (3.13)
Based on the previous analysis, we formally define the discounting operation in 3VSL as follows.
8
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Figure 2: Examples of parallel topologies
Definition 1 (Discounting Operation) Given three users A, B and C, if ωAB = 〈αAB, βAB, γAB〉 is A’s opinion
on B’s trust, and ωBC = 〈αBC , βBC , γBC〉 is B’s opinion on C’s trust, the discounting operation ∆(ωAB, ωBC)
computes A’s opinion on C as
∆(ωAB, ωBC) = 〈αAC , βAC , γAC〉 ,
where
αAC =
αABαBC
(αAB + βAB + γAB)
,
βAC =
αABβBC
(αAB + βAB + γAB)
,
γAC =
(βAB + γAB)(αBC + βBC + γBC) + αABγBC
(αAB + βAB + γAB)
.
(3.14)
Opinion ωBC being discounted can be viewed as the certain evidence in ωBC are distorted by opinion ωAB, and then
transferred into the uncertainty space of ωAC . Because the total amount of evidence in opinion ωAC = ∆(ωAB, ωBC)
is the same as ωBC ’s, we conclude the resulting opinion of discounting operation shares exactly the same evidence
space as the original opinion.
Based on the definition of discounting operation, it offers two interesting properties: decay and associative properties.
Corollary 3.1 Decay Property: Given two opinions ωAB and ωBC , ∆(ωAB, ωBC) yields a new opinion ωAC , where
αAC ≤ αBC , βAC ≤ βBC and γAC > γBC .
Proof 1 Because
αAB
(αAB + βAB + γAB)
≤ 1, according to Eq 3.14, we have αAC ≤ αBC as well as βAC ≤ βBC .
Hence, −αAC − βAC ≥ −βAC − βAC . According to Eq. 3.13, we have γAC ≥ γBC .
In other words, by applying the discounting operation, the uncertainty in trust (or in the resulting opinion) increases.
This property implies that the more trust propagates among users in an OSN, the more uncertain the resulting opinion.
Corollary 3.2 Associative Property: Given three opinions ωAB , ωBC and ωCD, ∆(∆(ωAB , ωBC), ωCD) ≡
∆(ωAB, ∆(ωBC , ωCD)).
Proof 2 Simply based on Eq 3.14.
However, the discounting operation is not commutative, i.e., ∆(ωAB, ωBC) 6= ∆(ωBC , ωAB). Given a se-
ries topology where opinions are ordered as ωA1A2 , ωA2,A3 , · · · , ωAn−1An , the final opinion can be calculated
as ∆(∆(∆(ωA1A2 , ωA2A3), · · · ), ωAn−1An). As the discounting operation is associative, it can be simplified as
∆(ωA1A2 , ωA2A3 , · · ·ωAn−1An).
3.4 Combining Operation
According to previous works [16, 17, 18], trust opinions can be fused into a consensus one by aggregating the evidence
from each opinion. We will use the parallel topology shown in Fig. 2(b) to explain how the combining operation works.
Let ωA1B1 = 〈αA1B1 , βA1B1 , γA1B1〉 and ωA2B2 = 〈αA2B2 , βA2B2 , γA2B2〉 be A’s two indirect/direct opinions on
B. We use {αA1B1 , βA1B1 , γA1B1} = DA1B1 and {αA2B2 , βA2B2 , γA2B2} = DA2B2 to represent the two sets of
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observations A made on B. According to the definition of an opinion, the expected probability that B will behave as
what A expects can be computed from the following DC distribution.∫
f(x = 1|pAB)f(pAB|DA1B1 ,DA2B2)d(pAB), (3.15)
The intuition of Eq. 3.15 can be explained as follows. A first infers the parameterspAB by aggregating the observations
DA1B1 andDA2B2 , i.e., the posterior pdf of pAB becomes
f(pAB|DA1B1 ,DA2B2). (3.16)
Then, based on the inferred parameters pAB , the probability that B will behave as what A expects can be computed
from f(x = 1|pAB). Considering all possible values of pAB , we can obtain the Eq. 3.15.
Now, we will give the analytic form of Eq. 3.16 as follows. A first forms his opinion on B fromDA1B1 . As such, the
pdf of pAB is obtained. Then, A adjusts the estimate for pAB based on another set of evidence DA2B2 . As a matter
of fact, Eq. 3.16 can be regarded as the distribution of pAB based on (1) the posterior evidence in DA2B2 and (2) the
prior parameters pA1B1 estimated fromDA1B1 . According to Bayesian inference, it can be expressed as follows.
f(pAB|DA1B1 ,DA2B2)
=
f(DA2B2 |pA1B1)f(pA1B1)
f(DA2B2)
=
f(DA2B2 |pA1B1)f(pA1B1)∫
f(DA2B2 |pA1B1)f(pA1B1)dpA1B1
. (3.17)
In the equation, pA1B1 is derived from DA1B1 that follows Dirichlet distribution, so its pdf can be computed as
follows.
f(pA1B1)
=
Γ (αA1B1 + βA1B1 + γA1B1)
Γ (αA1B1)Γ (βA1B1)Γ (γA1B1)
×
(p1)
αA1B1−1(p2)
βA1B1−1(p3)
γA1B1−1.
(3.18)
On the other hand, becauseDA2B2 follows the multinomial distribution, derived from pA1B1 , its pdf can be expressed
as
f(DA2B2 |pA1B1)
=
Γ (αA2B2 + βA2B2 + γA2B2 + 1)
Γ (αA2B2 + 1)Γ (βA2B2 + 1)Γ (γA2B2 + 1)
×
(p1)
αA2B2 (p2)
βA2B2 (p3)
γA2B2 .
(3.19)
Substituting Eq. 3.18 and Eq. 3.19 for f(pA1B1) and f(DA2B2 |pA1B1) in Eq. 3.17, the analytic form of Eq. 3.16 will
be
f(pAB|DA1B1 ,DA2B2)
=
Γ (αAB + βAB + γAB)
Γ (αAB)Γ (βAB)Γ (γAB)
×
(p1)
αAB−1(p2)
βAB−1(p3)
γAB−1,
(3.20)
where
αAB = αA1B1 + αA2B2 ,
βAB = βA1B1 + βA2B2 ,
γAB = γA1B1 + γA2B2 .
Obviously, Eq. 3.20 can be considered the most likely pdf of the following Dirichlet distribution.
Dir(αA1B1 + αA2B2 , βA1B1 + βA2B2 , γA1B1 + γA2B2).
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Then, the equation ∫
f(x|pAB)f(pAB|DA1B1 ,DA2B2)d(pAB)
can be regarded as a DC distribution upon observations {αA1B1+αA2B2 , βA1B1+βA2B2 , γA1B1+γA2B2}. The above
description essentially reflects the important property of DC distribution: two DC distributions can be combined, by
adding up the corresponding controlling hyper-parameters, to yield a new DC distribution.
According to the definition of an opinion, the analytic form of Eq. 3.15 can be expressed as∫
f(x = 1|pAB)f(pAB|DA1B1 ,DA2B2)d(pAB)
=
αA1B1 + αA2B2
αA1B1 + αA2B2 + βA1B1 + βA2B2 + γA1B1 + γA2B2
.
The probability that B will not behave as what A expects and the probability that B will behave in an ambiguous way
can be expressed as ∫
f(x = 2|pAB)f(pAB|DA1B1 ,DA2B2)d(pAB)
=
βA1B1 + βA2B2
αA1B1 + αA2B2 + βA1B1 + βA2B2 + γA1B1 + γA2B2
,
and ∫
f(x = 3|pAB)f(pAB|DA1B1 ,DA2B2)d(pAB)
=
γA1B1 + γA2B2
αA1B1 + αA2B2 + βA1B1 + βA2B2 + γA1B1 + γA2B2
,
respectively. As such, we are able to formally define the combining operation as follows.
Definition 2 (Combining Operation) Let ωA1B1 = 〈αA1B1 , βA1B1 , γA1B1〉 and ωA2B2 = 〈αA2B2 , βA2B2 , γA2B2〉
be the two opinions A has on B, the combining operationΘ(ωA1B1 , ωA2B2) is carried out as follows.
Θ(ωA1B1 , ωA2B2) = 〈αAB, βAB, γAB〉 , (3.21)
where {
αAB = αA1B1 + αA2B2
βAB = βA1B1 + βA2B2
γAB = γA1B1 + γA2B2
. (3.22)
It is worth mentioning that the combining operation yields two properties: commutative and associative proprieties.
Corollary 3.3 Commutative Property: Given two independent opinions ωA1B1 and ωA2B2 , Θ(ωA1B1 , ωA2B2) ≡
Θ(ωA2B2 , ωA1B1).
Proof 3 Based on Eq. 3.22.
Corollary 3.4 Associative Property: Given three independent opinions ωA1B1 , ωA2B2 and ωA3B3 , then
Θ(ωA1B1 , Θ(ωA2B2 , ωA3B3)) ≡ Θ(Θ(ωA1B1 , ωA2B2), ωA3B3).
Proof 4 Based on Eq. 3.22.
If A has more than two opinions on B, e.g., ωA1B1 , ωA2B2 · · ·ωAnBn , these opinion can be combined by
Θ(Θ(Θ(ωA1B1 , ωA2B2), · · · ), ωAnBn). As combining operation is commutative and associative, it can be rewritten as
Θ(ωA1B1 , ωA2B2 , · · ·ωAnBn).
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3.5 Expected Belief of An Opinion
With the proposed discounting and combining operations, the trust between two users in an OSN can be computed,
which will be elaborated in details in Section 4. Note that the computed trust is in the form of an opinion. To transform
an opinion into a trust value, i.e., the probability that a user is trustworthy, we need to design a mapping mechanism.
Given an opinion ωAX = 〈αAX , βAX , γAX〉, it is of interest to know how likely X will perform the desired action(s)
requested by A. We call this probability as the expected belief of ωAX . Although αAX denotes the belief of opinion
ωAX , components βAX , γAX also need to be considered in computing the expected belief.
We know that αAX and βAX are the numbers of (negative and positive) certain evidence, so they must be used in
computing the expected belief. γAX only records the uncertain evidence, so it should be omitted in the computation
of expected belief. Ignoring uncertain evidence, DC distribution of ωAX is collapsed into a Beta-Categorical (BC)
distribution.
f(p1, p2 |αAX , βAX )
=
Γ (αAX + βAX)
Γ (αAX) · Γ (βAX)
· (1− p1)
αAX−1pβAX−12 .
Consequently, the original opinion is collapsed into
ωAX = 〈αAX , βAX〉 .
With the collapsed opinion, we apply the approach proposed in [20] to compute the expected belief as follows.
EωAX =
(
αAX
αAX + βAX
+
βAX
αAX + βAX
)
aAX
× (1− cAX) +
αAX
αAX + βAX
· cAX
=
αAX
αAX + βAX
· cAX + aAX · (1− cAX),
(3.23)
where cAX is the certainty factor [20] of a Beta distribution, and aAX is the base rate. The certainty factor cAX ,
ranging from 0 to 1, is determined by the total amount of certain evidence and the ratio between positive and negative
evidence.
cAX =
1
2
∫ 1
0
∣∣∣∣ 1B(αAX , βAX)xαAX (1 − xβAX )− 1
∣∣∣∣dx. (3.24)
Basically, cAX approaches to 1 when the amount of certain evidence or the disparity between positive and negative
evidence is large.
4 AssessTrust Algorithm
Based on 3VSL and the discounting and combining operations, we design the AssessTrust (AT) algorithm to conduct
trust assessment in social networks with arbitrary topologies. Here, we treat a social network as a two-terminal directed
graph (TTDG), in which the two terminals represent the trustor and trustee, respectively. Obviously, the trustor and
trustee must be different users because a trustor will never evaluate the trust of itself. As a TTDG is not necessarily a
directed acyclic graph, there may be cycles in the network.
To ensure AT works in arbitrary topologies, we need to first prove AT can handle non-series-parallel network topolo-
gies.This is a challenge because the only operations available for trust computation are the discounting and combining
operations. The discounting/combining operation requires that the network topologies must be series/parallel. We ad-
dress this challenge by differentiating distorting opinions from original opinions in trust propagation. For example, if
A trustsB and B trusts C, then A’s opinion onB is called the distorting opinion, andB’s opinion on C is the original
opinion. We discover that, in trust fusion, the original opinions can be used only once but the distorting opinions can
be used any number of times. This is because the distorting opinion only depreciates certain evidence into uncertain
evidence, i.e., it does not change the total amount of evidence. On the other hand, when two (discounted) original
opinions are combined, the total number of evidence in the resulting opinion will be increased.
In addition, we have to further show that AT works in arbitrary TTDGs. This is a challenge because it is impossible
to test AT in all possible network topologies. We address this challenge by mathematically proving that AT works
in arbitrary networks. After addressing these two challenges, we present the AT algorithm and use an example to
illustrate how is works.
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Figure 3: Difference between distorting and original opinions
4.1 Properties of Different Opinions
For the two opinions involved in a discounting operation, their functionality are different, regarding to trust computa-
tion in an OSN.
Definition 3 (Distorting and Original Opinions) Given a discounting operation ∆(ωAB, ωBC), we define ωAB as
the distorting opinion, and ωBC the original opinion.
To understand the difference between the distorting and original opinions, we study two special cases, as shown in
Fig. 3. The detailed study reveals that a distorting opinion can be used several times in trust computation but an
original opinion can be used only once.
Theorem 4.1 Let ωB1C1 = 〈αB1C1 , βB1C1 , γB1C1〉 and ωB2C2 = 〈αB2C2 , βB2C2 , γB2C2〉 be two opinions B has on
C. Let ωAB = (αAB , βAB, γAB) be A’s opinion on B, then we always have
Θ(∆(ωAB , ωB1C1), ∆(ωAB , ωB2C2))
≡ ∆(ωAB, Θ(ωB1C1 , ωB2C2)). (4.1)
Proof 5 Let’s take a look at the left side of Eq. 4.1. According to the definition of discounting operation, the result of
∆(ωAB, ωB1C1) can be written as
ωAC1 = ∆(ωAB, ωB1C1)
= 〈αAC1 , βAC1 , γAC1〉 ,
where
αAC1 =
αABαB1C1
αAB + βAB + γAB
,
βAC1 =
αABβB1C1
αAB + βAB + γAB
,
γAC1 =
(βAB + γAB)(αB1C1 + βB1C1 + γB1C1)
αAB + βAB + γAB
+
αABγB1C1
αAB + βAB + γAB
.
(4.2)
The result of ∆(ωAB, ωB2C2) can be written as
ωAC2 = ∆(ωAB, ωB2C2)
= 〈αAC2 , βAC2 , γAC2〉 ,
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where
αAC2 =
αABαB2C2
αAB + βAB + γAB
,
βAC2 =
αABβB2C2
αAB + βAB + γAB
,
γAC2 =
(βAB + γAB)(αB2C2 + βB2C2 + γB2C2)
αAB + βAB + γAB
+
αABγB2C2
αAB + βAB + γAB
. (4.3)
If these two opinions are combined, we will have
ωAC = Θ(∆(ωA1B1 , ωBC), ∆(ωA2B2 , ωBC))
= 〈αAC , βAC , γAC〉 ,
where
αAC =
αABαB1C1 + αABαB2C2
αAB + βAB + γAB
,
βAC =
αABβB1C1 + αABβB2C2
αAB + βAB + γAB
,
γAC =
(βAB + γAB)(αB1C1 + βB1C1 + γB1C1)
αAB + βAB + γAB
+
αABγB1C1
αAB + βAB + γAB
+
(βAB + γAB)(αB2C2 + βB2C2 + γB2C2)
αAB + βAB + γAB
+
αABγB2C2
αAB + βAB + γAB
.
Now, we look at the right side of Eq. 4.1. The term Θ(ωB1C1 , ωB2C2) can be written as
ωBC = Θ(ωB1C1 , ωB2C2)
= 〈αBC , βBC , γBC〉 , (4.4)
where
αBC = αB1C1 + αB2C2 ,
βBC = βB1C1 + βB2C2 ,
γBC = γB1C1 + γB2C2 .
Putting Eq. 4.5 back into the equation, we have
ω′AC = ∆(ωAB , Θ(ωB1C1 , ωB2C2))
= 〈α′AC , β
′
AC , γ
′
AC〉 ,
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where
α′AC =
αAB(αB1C1 + αB2C2)
αAB + βAB + γAB
=
αABαB1C1 + αABαB2C2
αAB + βAB + γAB
,
β′AC =
αAB(βB1C1 + βB2C2)
αAB + βAB + γAB
=
αABβB1C1 + αABβB2C2
αAB + βAB + γAB
,
γ′AC =
(βAB + γAB)(αB1C1 + βB1C1 + γB1C1)
αAB + βAB + γAB
+
αABγB1C1
αAB + βAB + γAB
+
(βAB + γAB)(αB2C2 + βB2C2 + γB2C2)
αAB + βAB + γAB
+
αABγB2C2
αAB + βAB + γAB
. (4.5)
Clearly, ω′AC is equivalent to ωAC .
Theorem 4.2 Let ωA1B1 = (αA1B1 , βA1B1 , γA1B1) and ωA2B2 = (αA2B2 , βA2B2 , γA2B2) be A’s two opinions on B.
Let ωBC = (αBC , βBC , γBC) be B’s opinion on C, then the following equation does not hold.
Θ(∆(ωA1B1 , ωBC), ∆(ωA2B2 , ωBC))
≡ ∆(Θ(ωA1B1 , ωA2B2), ωBC). (4.6)
Proof 6 In Section 3, we have shown that the combining operation can be applied in Θ(ωA1B1 , ωA2B2) only if
the evidence in ωA1B1 and ωA2B2 are independent. In the left side of Eq. 4.6, opinions ∆(ωA1B1 , ωBC) and
∆(ωA2B2 , ωBC) share the same evidence from the opinion ωBC . As a result, the combining operation does
not apply here. Therefore, ∆(Θ(ωA1B1 , ωA2B2), ωBC) is the only correct solution, and it does not equal to
Θ(∆(ωA1B1 , ωBC), ∆(ωA2B2 , ωBC)).
From Theorems 4.1 and 4.2, we note that reusing ωAB in case (a) is allowed but reusing ωBC in case (b) is not.
The difference between ωAB and ωBC is that ωAB is a distorting opinion while ωBC is an original opinion. Therefore,
we conclude that in trust computation, an original opinion can be combined only once, while a distorting opinion can
be used any number of times, because it does not change the total amount of evidence in the resulting opinion.
4.2 Arbitrary Network Topology
As the distorting and original opinions are distinguished, we will prove that 3VSL is capable of handling non-series-
parallel network topologies.
Theorem 4.3 Given an arbitrary two-terminal directed graph G = (V,E) where A, C are the first and second
terminals, or the trustor and trustee. In the graph, a vertex u represents a user, the edge e(u, v) denotes u’s opinion
about v’s trust, denoted as ωuv. By applying the discounting and combining operations, the resulting opinion ωAC is
solvable and unique.
Proof 7 We prove the theorem in a recursive manner, i.e., reducing the original problem into sub-problem(s) and
continuing to reduce the sub-problems until the base case is solvable and yields a unique solution.
As shown in Fig. 4, we assume there are m nodes (c1, c2, · · · , cm) connecting to C, i.e., e(ci, C) ∈ E where i =
1, 2, · · · ,m. There are n nodes (a1, a2, · · · , an) being connected from A, i.e., e(A, aj) ∈ E where j = 1, 2, · · · , n.
Reduction rules
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Figure 4: Illustration of an arbitrary network topology
Case 1: If there is only one node connecting to C, i.e., m = 1, then ωAC = ∆(ωAc1 , ωc1C). In this case, we reduce
the problem of computing ωAC to calculating ωAc1 . We know A and c1 are connected in a smaller sub-graph.
Case 2: If there is more than one node connected to C, i.e., m > 1, ωAC is equal to
Θ(∆(ωAc1 , ωc1C), ∆(ωAc2 , ωc2C), · · · , ∆(ωAcm , ωcmC)) due to Theorem 4.1. Therefore, ωAC is solvable and unique
if and only if each ωAci is solvable and unique, where ωAci can be obtained from the sub-graph G
′, in which edges
{e(ci, C)} and node C are removed from G. In this case, we reduce the problem of computing ωAC to computing
ωAci .
In each round of reduction,G is reduced into a smaller graph, with |E| = |E| −m and |V | = |V | − 1. After applying
the reduction rules on sub-problems recursively, the base case will be eventually reached, i.e., |E| = 1 and |V | = 2.
Base Case
The graph of base case contains only one edge from A to aj where j = 1, 2, · · · , n. As ωAaj is known, the base case
is solvable and its solution is unique. Applying the equations in Case 1 and 2 repeatedly, we can obtain a unique
solution to ωAC .
4.3 Differences between 3VSL and SL
The major difference between SL and 3VSL lies in the definition of uncertainty in the trust models. In 3VSL, the
uncertainty in a trust opinion is measured by the number of uncertain evidence. However, the amount of uncertain
evidence in a SL opinion is always 2. Because uncertain evidence is obtained if an ambiguous behavior of a trustee is
observed, it could not be a constant number.
We take an example to explain the different definitions of uncertainty in SL and 3VSL models. Let’s consider a series
topology composed of A, B and C, as shown in Fig 1(b). We assume opinions ωAB 〈5, 3, 2〉 and ωBC = 〈4, 4, 2〉.
Then, A’s opinion of C’s trust can be computed by applying the discounting operation, defined in SL or 3VSL, on
opinions ωAB and ωBC , i.e., ωAC = ∆(ωAB, ωBC). With the SL model, we have ωAC = 〈2/3, 2/3, 2〉. Apparently,
10/3 positive evidence and 10/3 negative evidence are removed from the original evidence space. In other words, the
amount of certain evidence shrinks for 83%, i.e., 83% of evidence are distorted and disappear. Based on the SL model,
we know the belief component bAB in opinion ωAB equals to 5/(5 + 3 + 2) = 0.5, i.e., with 50% of chance, A could
trust B’s recommendation. That also implies only 50% of evidence should be distorted from B’s opinion of C, which
is not the case in the example.
In contrast, 3VSL model introduces an uncertainty state to keep tracking of the uncertain evidence generated when
trust propagates within an OSN. In 3VSL, we have ωAC = 〈2, 2, 6〉. The total number of evidence in the resulting
opinion ωAC is the same as ωBC , i.e., αAC + βAC + γAC = αBC + βBC + γBC = 10. In fact, only 50% of certain
evidence from αBC and βBC are transferred into γAC . Clearly, 3VSL leverages the uncertainty state to store the
“distorted” positive and negative evidence in trust propagation and hence achieves better accuracy. This hypothesis
will be validated in Section 5.
Another difference is that 3VSL is capable to handle a social network with arbitrary topologies while SL cannot. It
is well-known that SL can only handle series-parallel network topologies. A series-parallel graph can be decomposed
into many series (see Fig. 1) or parallel (see Fig. 2) sub-graphs so that every edge in the original graph will appear
only once in the sub-graphs [21]. In real-world social networks, however, the connection between two users could
be too complicated to be decomposed into series-parallel graphs. To apply the SL model, a complex topology has
to be simplified into a series-parallel topology by removing or selecting edges [22, 23, 24]. However, it is not clear
which edges need to be removed in a large-scale OSN. As a result, the solutions proposed in [22, 23, 24] cannot be
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implemented. In 3VSL, the difference between distorting and original opinions is first identified, and then a recursive
algorithm is designed accordingly. The algorithm is able to process social networks with complex topologies, even
with cycles.
4.4 AssessTrust Algorithm
Algorithm 1: AssessTrust(G, A, C, H)
Require: G, A, C, andH .
Ensure: ΩAC .
1: n← 0
2: if H > 0 then
3: for all incoming edges e(ci, C) ∈ G do
4: if ci = A then
5: Ωi ← ωciC
6: else
7: G′ ← G− e(ci, C)
8: ΩAci ← AssessTrust(G
′, A, ci, H − 1)
9: Ωi ← ∆(ΩAci , ωciC)
10: end if
11: n← n+ 1
12: end for
13: if n > 1 then
14: ΩAC = Θ(Ω1 · · ·Ωn)
15: else
16: ΩAC = Ωn
17: end if
18: else
19: ΩAC = 〈0, 0, 0〉
20: end if
Based on Theorem 4.3, we design the AssessTrust algorithm, as shown in Algorithm 1. The algorithm is based
on the 3VSL model and is able to handle any arbitrary network topologies. The inputs of AT algorithm include a
social network graph G, a trustor A, a trustee C, and the maximum searching depthH , measured by number of hops.
Specifically, H determines the longest distance the algorithm will search between the trustor and trustee. H controls
the searching depth of the AT algorithm, which is necessary because G could be potentially very large.
To computeA’s individual opinion onC, AT applies a recursive depth first search (DFS) on graphG, with a maximum
searching depth of H . AT starts from the trustee C and visits all C’s incoming neighbors ci’s, as shown in lines 1 to
12. For each node ci, we denoteA’s opinion on C’s trust obtained through ci as Ωi. At this moment, the opinionΩi is
unknown unless ci is the trustor node A. In this case, we have Ωi = ωciC = ΩAC . Otherwise, the value of Ωi needs
to be computed recursively by the AT algorithm. To do so, AT recalls itself on the new graph G′ that keeps all the
edges in the current graph except edge e(ci, C) and node C, as shown in line 7. The output of the AT algorithm, with
G′ as the input graph, will be A’s opinion on ci’s trust, as shown in line 9. When all the incoming neighbors ci’s are
processed, all the edges connecting to C will be removed from the graph as well. After that, if AT visits C again in
the future, i.e., C is involved in a cycle in G, the algorithm will stop as there is no incoming neighbor for C. In other
words, cycles in graph G will be eliminated when AT searches the graph. A cycle involving a node essentially means
the node holds a trust opinion about itself, which does not make sense as a node must absolutely trust itself. Therefore,
it is meaningless to let a node to compute its own trust, levering others’ opinions upon itself.
When the input graph becomes G′, the trustee will be ci and the maximum searching depth is decreased to H − 1, as
shown in line 8. If there are more than one ci, all the resulting opinions Ωi’s will be combined to yield the opinion
ΩAC , as shown in line 14. Otherwise, the only obtained opinion Ωi will be assigned to ΩAC , as shown in line 16. In
the end, if the searching depth reachesH , AT return an empty opinion, as shown in line 19.
4.5 Illustration of the AssessTrust Algorithm
In this section, we will use the bridge topology shown in Fig. 5(a) to illustrate how the AT algorithm computes A’s
indirect opinion on C, denoted as ΩAD. To differentiate from the direct opinion, we use Ω to denote the indirect
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Figure 5: An illustration of 3VSL based on the bridge topology
opinion. As shown in Fig. 5(a), to compute ΩAD , discounting and combining operations are applied on opinions
ωAB, ωAD, ωBD, ωCD, and ωBC . AT starts from the trustee D and searches the network backwards, and recursively
computes the trust of every node. As a result, we obtain a parsing tree, shown in Fig. 5(b), to indicate the correct order
that discounting and combining operations are applied in computingA’s opinion onD. By traversing the parsing tree
in a bottom-up manner,A’s indirect opinion aboutD can be computed as
Θ (∆(ωAB , ωBD), ∆(Θ(∆(ωAB , ωBC), ωAC), ωCD)) . (4.7)
To understand how exactly AT searches the bridge network, we use AT (k)(i, j) to denote it is for the kth time that AT
is called, to compute the i’s opinion on j. At the first time when AT is called, A’s opinion onD is computed from
Θ (∆(ΩAB , ωBD), ∆(ΩAC , ωCD)) ,
where ΩAB and ΩAC are A’s indirect opinions on B and C, respectively. These two opinions will then be computed
by AT (2)(A,B) and AT (3)(A,C), respectively. In AT (3)(A,C), AT computes A’s opinion about C as
Θ (∆(ΩAB , ωBC), ωAC) ,
where ΩAB is computed by AT
(4)(A,B). Finally, A’s opinion on D can be computed from Eq. 4.7. In the bridge-
topology network, the AT algorithm is called four times in total: AT (1)(A,D), AT (2)(A,B), AT (3)(A,C) and
AT (4)(A,B). Note that the opinion output from AT (A,B) is used twice, i.e., in sub-graphs A → B → C and
A→ B → D → C, which is allowed in 3VSL.
The AT algorithm still works if a cycle is introduced in the graph, e.g., the edge from B to D is reversed. With the
reversed edgeDB, a loopD → B → C → D is formed. In the following, we will show how AT works on the graph
with a cycle D → B → C → D. The algorithm starts from D and visits C, and then recalls itself on graph G′ in
whichD and edge CD are removed. The algorithm then reaches A andB. When it processesB, AT cannot visitD as
D was already removed, so the algorithm quits. As such, the cycleD → B → C → D is eliminated while computing
the indirect trust opinionΩAD .
4.6 Time Complexity Analysis
In this section, we present the time complexity of the AssessTrust algorithm. Because AT is a recursive algorithm, the
recurrence equation of its time complexity is
T (n) = (n− 1) · (T (n− 1) + C1) + C2 +O(n− 1)
= (n− 1) · T (n− 1) +O(n− 1) + C,
where (n − 1) is the maximum number of incoming edges to the trustee (line 3), assuming there are n nodes in the
network. T (n− 1) is the time complexity of recursively running AT on each branch (line 8), C1 is the time for lines
4− 7 and 9− 11. O(n− 1) is the time for combining operations (line 14). C2 is the time used outside the “for” loop
(line 13− 20). Therefore, the time complexity of AT is
O
(
H∑
i=1
(n− 1)!
(n− 1− i)!
)
= O(nH),
whereH is the maximum searching depth, and n is the number of nodes in the network.
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5 Evaluations
In this section, we evaluate the properties and performances of the 3VSL model and AT algorithm. We conduct
comprehensive experiments to evaluate the accuracy of 3VSL model and compare its performance to that of subjective
logic, in two real-world datasets: Advogato and PGP.
For the AT algorithm, we evaluate its accuracy and compare its performance to another trust assessment algorithm,
called TidalTrust, in Advogato and PGP. We investigate the reasons why AT outperforms TidalTrust by analyzing the
results obtained from these experiments.
To understand how accurate variousmodels are in assessing trust within OSNs, we adopt F1 score [25] as the evaluating
metric. The F1 score is chosen because it is a comprehensive measure for different models in predicting or inferring
trust [25].
After evaluating the accuracy of different trust models, we evaluate the performance of the AT algorithm and compare
it to these benchmark solutions: TrustRank and EigenTrust.
5.1 Dataset
The first dataset, Advogato, is obtained from an online software development community where an edge from user A
to B represents A’s trust on B, regarding B’s ability in software development. The trust value between two users is
divided into four levels, indicating different trust levels. The second dataset, Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), is collected
from a public key certification network where an edge from user A to B indicates that A issues a certificate to B, i.e.,
A trusts B. Similar to Advogato, the trust value is also divided into four levels.
According to the document provided by Advogato, a user determines the trust level of another user, based on only
certain evidence. Therefore, a low-trust edge in Advogato indicates an opinion that contains negative evidence. On the
other hand, in PGP, a user tends to give a low trust certification if he is not sure whether the other user is trustworthy
or not. A user in PGP will never give a certification to anyone who has malicious behavior. Therefore, a low trust
level in PGP indicates an opinion that contains uncertain evidence. We select these two datasets because they are
obtained from real world OSNs where trust relations between users are quantified as non-binary values. In addition,
the different definitions of trust in these two datasets allow us to evaluate the performance of 3VSL in different trust
social networks. Statistics of these datasets are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Statistics of the Advogato and PGP datasets.
Dataset # Vertices # Edges Avg Deg Diameter
Advogato 6,541 51,127 19.2 4.82
PGP 38,546 31,7979 16.5 7.7
5.2 Dataset Preparation
In Advogato, trust is classified into four ordinal levels: observer, apprentice, journeyer and master. Similarly, in PGP,
trust is classified into four levels: 0, 1, 2 and 3. Both Advogato and PGP provide directed graphs where users are
nodes and edges are the trust relations among users. Because the trust levels are in ordinal scales, a transformation is
needed to convert a trust level into a trust value, ranging from 0 to 1.
In the experiments, we set the total evidence values λ as 10, 20, 30, 40, and 50. Given a certain λ, we can represent an
opinion as
〈
α
λ
, β
λ
, γ
λ
〉
. As aforementioned, the meanings of trust in Advogato and PGP are different, so we use different
methods to construct opinions in Advogato and PGP. We assume the opinions in Advogato only contain positive and
negative evidence, i.e., γ = 0. Therefore, an opinion of 3VSL in Advogato can be expressed as
〈
α, λ
(
1− α
λ
)
, 0
〉
.
Given the total number of evidence value λ, an opinion in Advogato is in fact determined by α
λ
, i.e., the proportion of
positive evidence. To properly set the value of α
λ
, we use the normal score transformation technique [26] to convert
ordinal trust values into real numbers, ranging from 0 to 1. Specifically, trust levels are first converted into z-scores
by the normal score transformation method, based on their distributions in the datasets. Then, we map the z-scores to
different α
λ
’s, according to the differences among the z-scores. For example, the master level trust is converted into
(α
λ
)3 = 0.9. For the observer level trust, we use different values of (
α
λ
)0 as 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4 and 0.5 to indicate the
possible lowest trust levels. With the highest and lowest values of α
λ
, we interpolate the values of (α
λ
)1 and (
α
λ
)2 for
apprentice and journeyer level trusts, based on the intervals between the corresponding z-scores. Because there are
five different λ’s and five different (α
λ
)0’s, we have a total of 25 combinations of parameters.
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Figure 6: F1 scores of 3VSL and SL using the A) Advogato and B) PGP dataset. Parameters are the combinations
between base trust levels (0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4 and 0.5) and total evidence values (10, 20, 30, 40, and 50)
For the PGP dataset, we assume there is only positive and uncertain evidence, so we set β = 0. Therefore, an opinion
of 3VSL in PGP can be expressed as
〈
α, 0, λ(1− α
λ
)
〉
. Similar to Advogato, an opinion in PGP is determined by λ
and α
λ
. We use the same transformation method to convert the trust relations in PGP into opinions.
5.3 Accuracy of 3VSL Model
With the above-mentioned two datasets, we evaluate the accuracy of the 3VSL model. We also compare the accuracy
of the 3VSL model to the SL model. As we know, SL does not model the trust propagation process correctly and its
performance will degrade drastically in real-world OSNs. Due to this issue, SL cannot handle social networks with
complex network topologies. Although some approximation solutions are proposed, e.g., removing edges in a social
network to reduce it into a simplified graph, there is no existing algorithm that implements any of these solutions. To
make a fair comparison, we design an algorithm called SL*, based on the AT algorithm. The structure of the SL*
algorithm is exactly the same as AT’s, however, the discounting and combining operations used in the AT algorithm
are replaced with those defined in SL. As such, SL* implements the SL model and is able to work on OSNs with
arbitrary topologies.
The experiments are conducted as follows. First, we randomly select a trustor u from the datasets and find one of its
1-hop neighbors v. We take the opinion from u to v as the ground truth, i.e.., how u trusts v. Then, we remove the
edge (u, v) from the datasets, if there is a path from u to v. We run the above-mentioned algorithms to compute u’s
opinion of v’s trustworthiness. Finally, we compare the computed results to the ground truth. We select 200 pairs of
u and v to get statistically significant results. To compare the computed results to the ground truth, we first use the
expected beliefs of computed opinions as the trust values in 3VSL and SL. Then, we round the expected beliefs to the
closest trust levels based on the ground truths. Finally, we use F1 score to evaluate the accuracy of different models.
Because we do not know the correct parameter settings, we test the above-mentioned 25 combinations of parameters
to conduct a comprehensive evaluation.
As shown in Fig. 6(a) and 6(b), 3VSL achieves higher F1 scores than SL, with all different parameter settings, in both
datasets. Specifically, 3VSL achieves F1 scores ranging from 0.6 to 0.7 in Advogato, and 0.55 to 0.75 in PGP. On the
other hand, the F1 scores of SL range from 0.35 to 0.6 in Advogato and 0.55 to 0.67 in PGP. Considering F1 score is
within the range of [0, 1], we conclude that 3VSL significantly outperforms SL.
More importantly, we observe that the F1 scores of 3VSL are relatively stable, with different parameter settings.
However, the F1 scores of SL fluctuate, indicating SL is significantly affected by the parameter settings. Overall, we
conclude that 3VSL is not only more accurate than SL but also more robust to different parameter settings.
We further investigate the reason why 3VSL outperformsSL by looking at the evidence values in the resulting opinions,
computed by 3VSL and SL. We choose the results from experiments with the parameter setting (0.3, 30), wherein
3VSL performs the best. We are only interested in the cases where 3VSL obtains more accurate results than SL. We
measure the values of certain evidence (α + β) in the resulting opinions computed by 3VSL and SL. The CDFs of
the values of certain evidence are then plotted in Fig. 7. As shown in Fig. 7, the values of (α + β) in the opinions
computed by SL are much lower than that of 3VSL. It results in a lack of evidence in computing the expected beliefs
of opinions by SL. This observation matches the example introduced in Section 4.3. Because 3VSL employs a third
state to store the uncertainty generated in trust propagation, it is more accurate in modeling and computing trust in
OSNs.
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Figure 7: CDFs of α+ β in opinions computed by 3VSL and subjective logic using the Advogato dataset.
Advogato PGP
AT (0.3, 30) (0.1, 30)
SL* (0.3, 30) (0.1, 30)
TT (0.2,−) (0.1,−)
Table 2: Selected parameters (base trust level, total evidence value) for AT, SL* and TT. Note that TT employs a
number to represent trust, so its evidence value is empty.
5.4 Performance of the AssessTrust Algorithm
After validating the 3VSL model, we study the performance of the AT algorithm and compare it to other benchmark
algorithms, including TidalTrust (TT) [27], TrustRank (TR) [28] and EigenTrust (ET) [29]. TidalTrust is designed to
compute the absolute trust of any user in an OSN. However, TR and ET are used to rank users in an OSN based on
their relative trustworthiness, i.e., it does not compute the absolute trust.
Because different benchmark algorithms solve the trust assessment problem differently, we conduct two groups of
experiments. In the first group of experiments, we compare the performance of AT, SL* and TT in computing the
absolute trustworthiness of users in an OSN. In the experiments, we randomly select a trustor u from the datasets and
choose one of its 1-hop neighbors v. We take the opinion from u to v as the ground truth. Then, we remove the
edge (u, v) from the datasets, if there exist paths from u to v in the network. We run the AT, SL* and TT algorithms
to compute the trustworthiness of v, from u’s perspective. Finally, we compare the computed trustworthiness to the
ground truth.
Different parameters will affect the performances of various algorithms, so we choose different parameters for AT
and TT so that they can perform well in the experiments. Because we already validated that 3VSL outperforms SL,
regardless of the parameter settings, we choose the same parameter setting used by AT for SL*. The parameter settings
for different algorithms in different datasets are shown in Table 2.
We first look at the F1 scores of the trust assessment results generated by the three algorithms. The F1 scores are
plotted in Figs. 8(a) and 8(b). As shown in Figs. 8(a) and 8(b), AT outperforms TT in both datasets, i.e., TT achieves
0.617 and 0.605 F1 scores, and AT offers 0.7 and 0.75 F1 scores in Advogato and PGP. It is worth mentioning that SL*
gives the worst F1 scores, indicating that the problem of subjective logic in modeling uncertainty seriously impacts its
performance.
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Figure 8: F1 scores of the trust assessment results generated by TT, SL* and AT using the a) Advogato and b) PGP
datasets.
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(a) Error histogram of TT using the Advogato dataset (b) Error histogram of TT using the PGP dataset
(c) Error histogram of SL* using the Advogato dataset (d) Error histogram of SL* using the PGP dataset
(e) Error histogram of AT using the Advogato dataset (f) Error histogram of AT using the PGP dataset
Figure 9: Histogram of the errors generated by TT, SL* and AT using the Advogato and PGP dataset.
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Figure 10: Fitted curves of the error distributions of TT, SL* and AT using the a) Advogato and b) PGP dataset.
Besides F1 scores, we also study the distribution of errors in trust assessment results. The error here is defined as the
difference between the computed trust value and the ground truth. The error distributions of different algorithms are
shown in Figs. 9.
From Fig. 9(a), we can see that the errors of TT algorithm is either very small or very large when it is used to assess trust
using the Advogato dataset. For the SL* and AT algorithms, however, the errors are more concentrated around 0, as
shown in Figs. 9(c) and 9(e). If the PGP dataset is used, we observe the same phenomena, as shown in Figs. 9(b), 9(d)
and 9(f).
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Figure 11: The CDFs of Kendall’s tau ranking correlation coefficients of different algorithms using the a) Advogato
and b) PGP dataset.
We further fit this histogram data using the Normal Distribution. As shown in Figs 10(a) and 10(b), the fitted curves of
the error distributions of different algorithms clearly indicate that AT gives the best trust assessment results. In these
figures, we can see that the error distribution of TT has a close-to-zero mean, i.e., 0.005 for both datasets, but a large
variance. On the contrary, the fitted curves of the error distributions of SL* show that SL* has a smaller variance but
a large mean, i.e., 0.067 in Advogato and 0.016 in PGP. The fitted curves of the error distributions of AT give the best
results, i.e., with a mean of 0.015 in Advogato and 0.016 in PGP, and a smaller variance in both datasets.
In the second group of experiments, we evaluate the performance of AT, ET and TR, in terms of ranking users based
on their trustworthiness. We first randomly select a seed node u, and find all its 1-hop neighbors, denoted as V . Then,
we rank the nodes in V based on u’s direct opinions on these nodes, i.e., nodes with higher trust values are ranked in
higher positions than those with lower trust values. We take this ranking as the ground truth.
For each node v ∈ V , we remove edge (u, v) from the datasets if there exist paths from u to v. We run the AT, ET
and TR algorithms to compute the trustworthiness of node v, from the perspective of u. Then, we rank the nodes in
V based on the expected beliefs of ωuv’s for all possible v’s. We compare the ranking results obtained by the three
algorithms to the ground truth. Here, ranking errors are measured by Kendall’s tau ranking correlation coefficients
between the computed ranking results and the ground truth. We repeat each experiment 100 times in Advogato and
PGP to get statistically significant results.
In Figs. 11(a) and 11(b), AT gives more accurate ranking results, compared to other algorithms. In Advogato, the
Kendall’s tau correlation coefficients of AT are always greater than 0. Nearly 20% of the ranking results are exactly
the same (with a coefficient of 1) as the ground truth. In PGP, AT generates > 0.1 Kendall’s tau ranking correlation
coefficients, and about 40% of the ranking results are the same as the ground truth. On the other hand, for ET and TR
algorithms, only 20% (Advogato) and 10% (PGP) of their rankings are moderately correct, with coefficients> 0.5. In
other words, ET and TR do not work well in ranking users in an OSN, based on their trustworthiness.
6 Related Work
7 Definitions of Trust
Trust has been widely studied in psychology, sociology and management domains. A widely accepted definition of
trust was summarized by Rousseau in [10], based on a cross-disciplinary literature review: “Trust is a psychological
state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behaviors of
another.” Despite the various definitions of trust [30, 31, 11], they are similar to Rousseau’s, i.e., it can be concluded
that trust is composed of two parts: expectation and vulnerability. While the former indicates the probability that the
trustee will behave as expected, the latter shows the trustor’s willingness of relying on the trustee. Specifically, the
word vulnerability emphasizes the trustor’s concerns about the uncertainty [32, 33] of the trustee’s future behaviors.
The definition of trust in this dissertation is inspired by the above studies, and we define trust as the probability that
the trustee will behave as expected, from the perspective of the trustor.
Although trust is commonly confused with reputation, they are two different concepts. Previous works [34, 32, 35]
have identified the positive correlations between reputation and trust. However, reputation is not equivalent to trust.
According to the definition from Merriam-Webster dictionary and Wikipedia, reputation is the common opinion that
people have about someone or something, i.e., the overall quality or character as seen or judged by people in general.
In essence, reputation comes from the public and general opinion. However, trust comes from individual opinions, i.e.,
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from a trustor to a trustee with emphasis on personal interactions. On the other hand, reputation is a summary of past
events while trust is the intention and expectation of the future.
How to model the trust between users in OSNs has attracted much attention in recent years. Existing trust models
can be categorized into four groups: topology based, PageRank based, probability based, and subjective logic based
models. In this section, we briefly introduce these works.
7.1 Topology based Models
Trust between users in OSNs was first studied by analyzing the characteristics of the network topology between the
users. Topology based trust models treat a social network as a graph, where the edge between users represents the
trust relation between them. The advantage of these models is that they leverage random walk to evaluate users’
trust, and thus can easily be applied in large-scale social networks. By analyzing network topologies, the works
in [36, 37, 38, 39] are able to identify untrustworthy nodes in an OSN. The basic idea is to distinguish untrustworthy
regions from trustworthy regions in a social network. Specifically, the random walk algorithm is applied, starting
from a trustor and searching the network to compute the probability that a trustee will be visited. A low probability
indicates the trustee is in the untrustworthy region, and thus untrustworthy. Later on, the trust relation between two
users is treated as a probabilistic value in [40]. Then, indirect trust inference becomes a network reachability problem.
For example, in [41], a social network is considered a resistor network where the resistance of each edge is derived
from the trust of the two users being connected by the edge. In [42, 43], a depth first search algorithm is employed to
compute the trust between two users.
7.2 PageRank based Models
Instead of analyzing the entire structure of a social network, PageRank based solutions are inspired by the assumption
that trustworthy users are likely to have more connections from other users. PageRank based trust models employ the
PageRank algorithm [44] to compute the relative trust of users. For example, the EigenTrust algorithm[29] searches a
social network based on the following rule: it moves from a user to another with probability proportional to how the
user trusts the other, i.e., higher the trust, higher the probability. In this way, EigenTrust algorithm is more likely to
reach more trustworthy users. Similarly, the TrustRank algorithm [28] also employs the PageRank algorithm to rank
users, based on their relative trust values. Both EigenTrust and TrustRank extend the PageRank algorithm that was
commonly used to determine the importance scores of web pages. The assumption that PageRank algorithm depends
on, however, may not be realistic in a social network environment, leading to inaccurate trust assessment results.
7.3 Probability based Models
Unlike the aforementioned models that treat trust as either binary or real numbers, the probability based model con-
siders trust as a probability, i.e., the likelihood that a trustee is trustworthy. Probability based trust models usually
represent trust as a probability distribution. In these models, a trustor uses its interactions with a trustee to construct
a probabilistic distribution to estimate the trustee’s trust. The benefit of these models is that trust is accurately mod-
eled by a rich set of statistical and probability techniques, including Hidden Markov chain and maximum likelihood
estimation. In this category, trust can be represented by several different probability distributions [45, 46, 47, 48, 49].
The trust assessment becomes the problem of likelihood estimation, regarding to the corresponding distribution’s pa-
rameters, based on observed evidence. For example, trust was first modeled as a binomial distribution in [13], and
the likelihood estimation was carried out, based on Beta distribution. Then, trust is considered a continuous random
variable [45, 46], and Gaussian distribution is used to model trust. Binomial distribution is further extended to a
multinomial distribution, to handle the cases where trust is a discrete random variable [50]. Based on multinomial
distribution, Bayesian inference [46, 45] and Hidden Markov Model (HMM) [47, 48, 49] can be applied to realize
trust assessments.
While the former integrates evidence from various sources, e.g., reputation and preference similarity of users, the latter
focuses on trust modeling in a dynamic environment.
7.4 Subjective Logic based Models
The 3VSL model extends the subjective logic (SL) trust models [13, 51, 52] by redefining the uncertainty in trust, and
thus achieves more accurate trust assessments. Therefore, it is worth studying the fundamental principles of SL, and
the limitations when SL is applied in trust assessment in OSNs. Considering trust as a binary event, i.e., a trustee is
trustworthy or untrustworthy, SL assumes the probability of a trustee being trustworthy follows Beta distribution. The
Beta distribution can be formed based on the amounts of positive and negative evidence, collected by a trustor about
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the trustee. The advantage of SL based models is that trust is more accurately modeled and the uncertainty in trust
is considered. In [53, 54, 55, 56, 22, 23], the SL model is further refined and better trust assessment performance is
achieved.
Subjective logic based models treat trust as an opinion and introduce a set of opinion operations, e.g., discounting
and consensus operations to account for trust propagation and trust fusion, respectively. The consensus operation
provides a mechanism to combine possibly-conflicting opinions to generate a consensus opinion [57]. On the other
hand, the discounting operation is used to help a trustor to derive indirect trust of the trustee, based on other users’
recommendations [58]. For instance, if Alice trusts Bob, and Bob trusts Claire, then Alice will have an indirect opinion
on Claire’s trust. With the discounting and consensus operations, the trust between any two uses in an OSN can be
computed. In addition to the basic discounting and consensus operations, multiplication, co-multiplication, division,
and co-division of opinions are also defined in the SL models [59].
Later on, the SL model is extended to support conditional inference [60]. A conditional inference is represented in the
form of “IF x THEN y” where x denotes the antecedent and y the consequent proposition. The antecedentx is modeled
by the SLmodel, so it is not a binary value; instead, it is a vector, representing the probability that this antecedent is true.
Overall, SL was proven to be compatible with binary logic, probability calculus, and classical probabilistic logic [61].
The properties are also inherited in the proposed 3VSL model, which makes 3VSL computationally effective for trust
assessments in OSNs.
7.5 Applications of Trust in Online Systems
Along with the rapid development of the Internet and online services, trust has been used in many applications for
either improving users’ quality of experience (QoE) or preventing the disturbance of malicious users. In this section,
we briefly introduce these applications.
7.6 Trust in Cloud Computing
Recently, trust was introduced in the concept of social cloud [62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70]. In [63], Mohaisen et
al. employ trust as a metric to identify good workers for an outsourcer through her social network. In [68], Moyano
et al. proposed a framework to employ trust and reputation for cloud provider selection. In [70], Pietro et al. pro-
posed a multi-round approach, called AntiCheetah, to dynamically assign tasks to cloud nodes, accounting for their
trustworthiness. In [64], Zhou et al. studied the trust factors affecting potential partnerships in bike sharing systems.
7.7 Trust in P2P Network and Semantic Web
Trust analysis was first implemented in peer-to-peer (P2P) networks [71, 29, 72, 14]. In P2P networks, trust is used
to evaluate the trustworthiness of a particular resource owner, and thereby identify malicious sources. Trust analysis
was also applied to semantic webs [73, 74, 75]. The purpose of analyzing trust in semantic webs is to study the
trustworthiness of data with efficient knowledge processing mechanisms. For example, the trustworthiness of web
hyperlinks are studied in [76, 28, 77]. Trust analysis is then applied to filter untrustworthy contents in [78, 79, 80, 81,
82, 83]. Finally, trust was used to evaluate the quality of contents on semantic webs in [84, 85, 86, 87, 27, 76].
7.8 Trust in Cyber-Physical and Edge Computing Systems
Trust analysis is also introduced in cyber-physical systems (CPS), e.g., wireless sensor networks [88, 89, 90, 91, 92,
93, 94, 95, 96, 97] and vehicular networks [98, 99, 100, 101]. For example, a trust based framework is proposed to
secure data aggregation in wireless sensor networks [102], which evaluates the trustworthiness of each sensor node by
the Kullback-Leibler (KL) distance to identify the compromised nodes through an unsupervised learning technique.
In [103], trust analysis is employed to identify malicious and selfish nodes in a mobile ad hoc network. In addition,
Xiaoyan et al. propose a new trust architecture, called situation-aware trust (SAT), to address several important trust
issues in vehicular networks, which are essential to overcome the weaknesses of current vehicular network security
and trust models [98].
7.9 Trust in Spam Detection and Sybil Defense
Another important domain in which trust analysis is widely applied is Sybil defense and spam detection [104, 36, 105,
106, 107, 108]. The goal of these works is to identify forged multiple identities and spam information in OSNs. The
basic idea of [104, 36] is to employ random walk to rank the neighbors in a given OSN from a seed node, and extract
a trust community composed of high ranking nodes. Then, the users outside the trust community will be considered
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as not trustworthy, i.e., potential Sybil nodes. In [107], Tan et al. integrated traditional Sybil defense techniques with
the analysis of user-link graphs. In [108], Mohaisen et al. proposed a derivation of the random walk algorithm, which
employs biased random mechanism, to account for trust and other social ties. In [109], besides graph based features,
Yang et al. introduced some other features to identify spammers. In addition, in [106, 105], spam detection approaches
based on user similarity and content analysis are studied.
7.10 Trust in Recommendation and Crowdsourcing Systems
In addition to Sybil defense in OSNs, trust analysis is also useful in recommendation systems [2, 110, 111, 23, 112,
113]. For example, in [110], Zou et al. proposed a belief propagation algorithm to identify untrustworthy recommen-
dations generated by spam users. In [2], Basu et al. proposed a privacy preserving trusted social feedback scheme to
help users obtain opinions from friends and experts whom they trust. In [111], Andersen et al. proposed a trust-based
recommendation system that generates personalized recommendations by aggregating the opinions from other users.
In addition, five axioms about trust in a recommendation system are studied in [111].
8 Conclusions
In this paper, the three-valued subjective logic is proposed to model and compute trust between any two users con-
nected within OSNs. 3VSL introduces the uncertainty space to store evidence distorted from certain spaces as trust
propagates through a social network, and keeps track of evidence as multiple trusts combine. We discover that there
are differences between distorting and original opinions, i.e., distorting opinions are so unique that they can be reused
in trust computation while original opinions are not. This property enables 3VSL to handle complex topologies, which
is not feasible in the subjective logic model.
Based on 3VSL, we design the AT algorithm to compute the trust between any pair of users in a given OSN. By
recursively decomposing an arbitrary topology into a parsing tree, we prove AT is able to compute the tree and get
the correct results. An open issue to 3VSL and OpinionWalk is how to estimate the value of evidences. This issue is
further studied and addressed by probabilistic graphic models or neural network models [114].
We validate 3VSL both in experimental evaluations. The evaluation results indicate that 3VSL is accurate in modeling
computing trust within complex OSNs. We further compare the AT algorithm to other benchmark trust assessment
algorithms. Experiments in two real-world OSNs show that AT is a better algorithm in both absolute trust computation
and relative trust ranking.
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